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UP IN SMOKE:
WHY REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA LIKE BIG
TOBACCO WON’T WORK (YET!)
Ian McKay*
INTRODUCTION
In May of 2021, Frances Haugen resigned from her job at
Facebook. 1 Her resignation was not newsworthy. But what she did
after she resigned ignited a firestorm of news articles 2 and numerous
Senate hearings. 3 Before leaving Facebook, Ms. Haugen had
collected hundreds of internal documents demonstrating Facebook
knew its products could be harmful to users. 4 Upon leaving the
company, she leaked the files to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) to be

* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2023; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science, Point Loma Nazarene University, 2013. This Note would not be possible
without my incredible family, who unwaveringly supports my academic pursuits, and my
friend Michael Kineman who made me a better writer through his thoughtful critiques of
past prose. A special thanks to Professor Patricia L. Bellia for her thoughtful suggestions
on this topic. Lastly, I would like to thank my colleagues on the Notre Dame Law Review for
their tireless attention to detail and dedication to excellence. All errors are mine.
1 See Cat Zakrzewski & Cristiano Lima, Former Facebook Employee Frances Haugen
Revealed as ‘Whistleblower’ Behind Leaked Documents that Plunged the Company into Scandal,
WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/03
/facebook-whistleblower-frances-haugen-revealed/ [https://perma.cc/TF9Q-B89S].
2 See Keach Hagey & Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Tried to Make Its Platform a Healthier Place.
It Got Angrier Instead., WALL ST. J. (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/facebook-algorithm-change-zuckerberg-11631654215?mod=article_inline
[https://
perma.cc/Z5KJ-RFPN]; Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Says Its Rules Apply to All. Company Documents
Reveal a Secret Elite That’s Exempt, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/facebook-files-xcheck-zuckerberg-elite-rules-11631541353?mod=article_inline
[https://perma.cc/N3SJ-RTTD]; Kevin Roose, Facebook Is Weaker than We Knew, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/04/technology/facebook-files.html
[https://perma.cc/WHY5-8BFB].
3 See infra notes 9–10, 138.
4 See Adam Satariano & Mike Isaac, Facebook Whistle-Blower Brings Campaign to Europe
After Disclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/25
/business/frances-haugen-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/QM7P-LB9V].
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published. 5 Five months after her quiet resignation from Facebook,
Ms. Haugen, who earned the title the “Facebook whistleblower,” was
asked to testify before Congress. 6
During her testimony before the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Data Security, Ms.
Haugen urged lawmakers to regulate social media companies like
tobacco: “When we realized tobacco companies were hiding the
harms it caused, the government took action. . . . I implore you to do
the same here.” 7 Ms. Haugen was not the first critic of social media
companies to compare the social media industry to the tobacco
industry.
In recent years, lawmakers, academics, and tech executives have
likened social media companies to tobacco companies. In an email
to the WSJ, United States Senator Richard Blumenthal wrote,
“Facebook seems to be taking a page from the textbook of Big
Tobacco—targeting teens with potentially dangerous products while
masking the science in public.”8 In a recent Senate hearing, Senator
Blumenthal said, “Facebook has taken Big Tobacco’s playbook, it has
hidden its own research on addiction, and the toxic effects of its
products . . . and it has weaponized childhood vulnerability against
children themselves.”9 At the same hearing, Senator Edward Markey
also likened social media to tobacco products, saying that “Instagram
is that first childhood cigarette, meant to get teens hooked early . . .
5 See Zakrzewski & Lima, supra note 1. The Journal’s series of articles based on the
documents Haugen leaked are now known as “The Facebook Files.” See generally The
Facebook Files, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-facebook-files-11631713039
[https://perma.cc/Y9XF-U87W].
6 See Zakrzewski & Lima, supra note 1.
7 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Product Safety & Data Sec. of the S.
Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 117th Cong. (Oct. 4, 2021) (statement of Frances Haugen,
Former Facebook Emp.) [hereinafter Written Statement of Frances Haugen] (this
hearing has not been officially published yet, but both the video recording of the hearing
and Ms. Haugen’s written statement can be found at https://www.commerce.senate.gov
/2021/10/protecting%20kids%20online:%20testimony%20from%20a%20facebook
%20whistleblower [https://perma.cc/WZ2F-PS8E]).
8 Georgia Wells, Jeff Horwitz & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Knows Instagram Is
Toxic for Teen Girls, Company Documents Show, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 14, 2021), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-instagram-is-toxic-for-teen-girls-companydocuments-show-11631620739?mod=hp_lead_pos7&mod=article_inline [https://perma
.cc/PQW2-2942].
9 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Product Safety & Data Sec. of the S.
Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 117th Cong. (Sept. 30. 2021) (Statement of Sen. Richard
Blumenthal, Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Product Safety & Data Sec.) (this
hearing has not been officially published yet, but the video recording of Senator
Blumenthal’s statement, can be viewed at https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2021/9
/protecting-kids-online-facebook-instagram-and-mental-health-harms [https://perma.cc
/R3QP-9Q7F] starting at 50:53).
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and ultimately endangering their health. Facebook is just like Big
Tobacco, pushing a product that they know is harmful to the health
of young people . . . so Facebook can make money.” 10
Academics have also likened the harms of social media to the
harms of tobacco. In an opinion piece, Joan Donovan and Jennifer
Nilsen—who are researchers at Harvard’s Shorenstein Center on
Media, Politics, and Public Policy—likened the harms of vaccine
misinformation on social media to the harms of second-hand
smoke. 11 Writing for the Harvard Business Review, professors from
MIT and Harvard argued that social media companies should follow
the path of tobacco companies and begin self-regulating. 12
Even tech executives and venture capitalists have posited that
social media and tobacco companies are similar. During an interview
in 2018, Marc Benioff—the CEO of Salesforce—argued that social
media companies should be regulated like cigarette companies. 13
Benioff said, “I think that you do it exactly the same way that you
regulated the cigarette industry. Here’s a product: Cigarettes.
They’re addictive, they’re not good for you.” 14 Roger McNamee—an
early investor in Facebook—urged that, “[t]he challenges posed by
internet platform monopolies require new approaches beyond
antitrust enforcement. We must recognise and address these
challenges as a threat to public health. One possibility is to treat

10 See , Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Product Safety & Data Sec. of the
S. Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 117th Cong. (Sept. 30. 2021) (statement of Sen. Edward
Markey, Member, Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Product Safety & Data Sec.) (this
hearing has not been officially published yet, but the video recording of Senator Markey’s
statement, can be viewed at https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2021/9/protecting-kidsonline-facebook-instagram-and-mental-health-harms
[https://perma.cc/R3QP-9Q7F]
starting at 1:37:14).
11 Joan Donovan & Jennifer Nilsen, Facebook, Twitter and Other Social Media Companies
Need to Be Treated like Big Tobacco, NBCNEWS (July 15, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com
/think/opinion/facebook-twitter-other-social-media-companies-need-be-treated-bigncna1274000 [https://perma.cc/XZ8M-972E] (noting that the ubiquitous spread of
misinformation on social media, especially as it pertains to the COVID-19 vaccine, is “like
secondhand smoke . . . [i]t causes harm to the public’s health”).
12 See Michael A. Cusumano, Annabelle Gawer & David B. Yoffie, Social Media
Companies Should Self-Regulate. Now., HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 15, 2021), https://hbr.org
/2021/01/social-media-companies-should-self-regulate-now
[https://perma.cc/PMZ5V38E].
13 See Anita Balakrishnan, Facebook Should Be Regulated like a Cigarette Company, Says
Salesforce CEO, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/23/salesforce-ceomarc-benioff-says-regulate-facebook-like-tobacco.html [https://perma.cc/N3ED-TCT2].
14 Id.
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social media in a manner analogous to tobacco and alcohol,
combining education and regulation.” 15
Lawmakers, pundits, and tech executives’ assertion that social
media should be regulated like tobacco in order to protect American
teenagers is oversimplistic. While the comparison makes for a good
sound bite for the press, the argument disregards the inherent
differences between regulating a physical product that has no
constitutional protection and a virtual product that can implicate
both users’ and social media companies’ First Amendment rights.
This paper will identify and analyze some of the main pillars of the
tobacco regulatory scheme and apply them to social media products.
In Part I, I will define social media and provide a summary of
documented harms, or lack thereof, that are correlated to teenage
social media use. I will then make an argument for why the federal
government would be interested in regulating the industry as
opposed to encouraging teenagers to remove themselves from the
platforms. In Part II, I will provide a brief summary of the tobacco
regulatory scheme, both past and present. I will demonstrate how the
tobacco regulatory scheme developed over decades and how it has
been constitutionally challenged. In Part III, I will analyze two pillars
of the tobacco regulatory scheme—age restrictions on access and
mandated health warnings—and apply them to social media
products. In doing so, I will demonstrate that there will likely be
constitutional challenges if either of these provisions were adopted.
Finally, in Part IV, I will offer a brief legislative recommendation in
order to avoid future constitutional challenges to a potential social
media regulatory scheme.
I.

SOCIAL MEDIA, TEENAGE USE, AND WHY QUITTING IS HARD

A thorough analysis of the philosophical (and frankly, esoteric)
debate surrounding social media definitions is beyond the scope of
this paper. 16 Like the statutory definition of cigarettes, 17 a definition
of social media should draw upon the common features of popular
social media platforms without listing the actual platform themselves.
For the purposes of this paper, I will rely on a definition of a single

15 See Roger McNamee, Why Not Regulate Social Media like Tobacco or Alcohol?,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/jan/29/socialmedia-tobacco-facebook-google [https://perma.cc/BB7W-23LW].
16 I note the definition challenge because it presents the first challenge for
regulators who are trying to regulate “social media.” It is likely that different stakeholders
will arrive at different conclusions regarding what qualifies as social media.
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 1332(1) (2018).
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category of social media: social networking sites. 18 danah boyd 19 and
Nicole Ellison’s foundational work, Social Network Sites: Definition,
History, and Scholarship, offers a clear and operative definition for the
purpose of this paper. 20 They define social networking sites as “webbased services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semipublic profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other
users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse
their list of connections and those made by others within the
system.” 21 Moreover, boyd and Ellison’s definition encapsulates the
major social media platforms that American teenagers
overwhelmingly use. 22 Without exception, these platforms allow for
users to create profiles, follow other users, and view other users’
content. 23
A. The Harms of Teenage Social Media Use
A concerted and comprehensive effort to regulate tobacco did
not emerge in the United States until after the Surgeon General’s
landmark 1964 report, Smoking and Health, demonstrated that
smoking caused a plethora of diseases and teenage tobacco use was
especially dangerous. 24
Unlike the government’s research on
tobacco, there is not a definitive report assessing the harms of social
18 I will use “social networking sites” and “social media” interchangeably. However,
it is imperative to note that social media can encapsulate a broader spectrum of platforms.
19 The author purposefully de-capitalizes her name.
20 danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUT.-MEDIATED COMMC’N 210 (2008). danah boyd has been called
“[t]he clear pioneer in the study of social media” and Social Network Sites: Definition,
History, and Scholarship has been considered “the most influential paper to date” on the
subject. DANIEL MILLER, ELISABETTA COSTA, NELL HAYNES, TOM MCDONALD, RAZVAN
NICOLESCU, JOLYNNA SINANAN, JULIANO SPYER, SHRIRAM VENKATRAMAN & XINYUAN WANG,
HOW THE WORLD CHANGED SOCIAL MEDIA 9–10 (2016) (footnote omitted).
21 boyd & Ellison, supra note 20, at 211. boyd and Ellison also note that “[t]he
nature and nomenclature of these connections may vary from site to site.” Id.
22 See MONICA ANDERSON & JINGJING JIANG, PEW RSCH. CTR., TEENS, SOCIAL MEDIA
AND TECHNOLOGY 2018 at 2 (2018); Felix Richter, 7 in 10 American Teens Use TikTok,
STATISTA (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.statista.com/chart/22446/most-used-social-mediaplatforms-by-us-teens/ [https://perma.cc/RR5Z-Q7JC] (demonstrating the dramatic rise
of TikTok use by teenagers since 2018).
23 See FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ [https://perma.cc/48EX-9XEM];
INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/ [https://perma.cc/RPZ2-7V5V]; SNAPCHAT,
https://www.snapchat.com/ [https://perma.cc/UF9Z-YB3V]; TIKTOK, https://www
.tiktok.com [https://perma.cc/AHX9-4HR3]; TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ [https://
perma.cc/25BP-BZMF]; YOUTUBE, youtube.com [https://perma.cc/3GEP-WWJB]. There
are additional social media platforms that have similar features, but the above-mentioned
platforms are the sites most frequently used by American teenagers.
24 See infra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
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media on teenagers. Current studies of social media and its harmful
effects can only demonstrate correlative relationships. However,
while there may be spurious factors that impact the relationship
between social media and its alleged harmful effects, 25 researchers
are finding that social media use likely has some negative impact on
teenagers’ mental and physical well-being. 26
Teenage social media use has been tied to increased feelings of
inferiority. Internal Facebook research published by the WSJ has
demonstrated that Facebook found that forty percent of teens who
used Instagram said they began to feel “unattractive” after using the
app. 27 The internal research also found that roughly twenty-five
percent of teenage users who stated that they felt “not good enough”
trace that feeling back to Instagram. 28 Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan
Haidt, in their seminal book, The Coddling of the American Mind, argue
that another one of social media’s consequences is that teenage girls
are now “bombarded with images of girls and women whose beauty is
artificially enhanced, making girls ever more insecure about their
own appearance.” 29 Indeed, research has found that females may
suffer more from the negative effects of social media use than

25 See Hayeon Song, Anne Zmyslinski-Seelig, Jinyoung Kim, Adam Drent, Angela
Victor, Kikuko Omori & Mike Allen, Does Facebook Make You Lonely? A Meta Analysis, 36
COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 446, 451 (2014) (finding that a correlation between loneliness
and Facebook use did not necessarily demonstrate that Facebook caused loneliness but
instead suggested Facebook might attract people who are already lonely).
26 See Hunt Allcott, Luca Braghieri, Sarah Eichmeyer & Matthew Gentzkow, The
Welfare Effects of Social Media, 110 AM. ECON. REV. 629, 672 (2020) (finding that spending
four weeks away from Facebook “improves subjective well-being and substantially reduces
post-experiment demand, suggesting that forces such as addiction . . . may cause people to
use Facebook more than they otherwise would”); Holly B. Shakya & Nicholas A.
Christakis, Association of Facebook Use with Compromised Well-Being: A Longitudinal Study, 185
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 203, 203 (finding that “Facebook was negatively associated with wellbeing” after compiling data on 5208 subjects’ self-reported physical health, mental health,
life satisfaction, and body mass index); Morten Tromholt, The Facebook Experiment: Quitting
Facebook Leads to Higher Levels of Well-Being, 19 CYBERPSYCH., BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING
661, 661 (2016) (finding that participants who took a break from Facebook experienced
an increase in life satisfaction and positive emotions); Jean M. Twenge, Thomas E. Joiner,
Megan L. Rogers & Gabrielle N. Martin, Increases in Depressive Symptoms, Suicide-Related
Outcomes, and Suicide Rates Among U.S. Adolescents After 2010 and Links to Increased New
Media Screen Time, 6 CLINICAL PSYCH. SCI. 3, 3 (2017) (“Adolescents who spent more time
on new media (including social media and electronic devices such as smartphones) were
more likely to report mental health issues . . . .”).
27 See Wells et al., supra note 8.
28 See id.
29 GREG LUKIANOFF & JONATHAN HAIDT, THE CODDLING OF THE AMERICAN MIND
155 (2018).
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males. 30 However, for both males and females, the negative impact of
social media use on self-esteem is worse than the effects of other
media. 31 Researchers have found that adolescents who spend an
hour on social media suffer from a greater decrease in self-esteem
than those who spend an hour playing video games or general
computer use. 32
More concerning than increased feelings of inferiority is the rise
of depression in American teenagers. After decades of declining
rates of depression and suicide among American adolescents, there
was an increase in “depressive symptoms, suicide-related outcomes,
and suicide deaths” between 2010 and 2015. 33 These “iGen
adolescents” report more mental health issues and experience higher
rates of suicide than either Millennials or Gen X’ers did at their
age. 34 2010 also marked an increase in adolescent use of social media
and electronic devices and a decrease in “nonscreen activities such as
in-person social interaction, print media, sports/exercise, and
attending religious services, activities negatively correlated with
depressive symptoms.” 35 Researchers concluded that this increase in
screen time on new media beginning in 2010 impacted adolescents’
mental well-being. 36 Jean M. Twenge, who led the previously cited
study, further argued in her book, iGen, that:
The sudden, sharp rise in depressive symptoms occurred at
almost exactly the same time that smartphones became ubiquitous
30 See id. at 154–55 (suggesting that the accelerated deterioration of mental health
among younger women may be the result of their increased negative psychological
response to feelings of being left out after constantly seeing people having fun on social
media and their own reliance on “‘relationally’ aggressive” tactics to intentionally remind
other girls that that they are being excluded on purpose (quoting Nicki R. Crick &
Jennifer K. Grotpeter, Relational Aggression, Gender, and Social-Psychological Adjustment, 66
CHILD DEV. 710, 710 (1995))); Twenge et al., supra note 26, at 8–13 (suggesting that
female middle and high school students experienced higher rates of depressive symptoms
associated with social media use than their male counterparts).
31 See Elroy Boers, Mohammad H. Afzali, Nicola Newton & Patricia Conrod,
Association of Screen Time and Depression in Adolescence, 173 JAMA PEDIATRICS 853, 857
(2019).
32 See id. at 856–57. This study also found that an hour spent watching television led
to an increase in self-esteem for teenagers. Id.
33 Twenge et al., supra note 26, at 13.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See id. at 15. “New media screen time is both associated with mental health issues
and increased over this time period. Thus, it seems likely that the concomitant rise of
screen time and adolescent depression and suicide is not coincidental.” Id. (emphasis
added). These researchers also accounted for economic recession indicators, a cause of
depression, and found that these indicators were “not positively correlated” while
“smartphone adoption and social media use . . . were positively correlated” with mental
health issues. Id. at 13.
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and in-person interaction plummeted. That seems like too much
of a coincidence for the trends not to be connected, especially
because spending more time on social media and less time on inperson social interaction is correlated with depression. 37

Again, teenage females seem to be suffering more than teenage
males. Twenge notes that between 2012 and 2015 the rise in
depression increased by twenty-one percent in males whereas
depression in females increased by fifty percent—more than double
that of males. 38 Additionally, social media platforms are a conduit for
cyberbullying which has been shown to have more deleterious effects
on the mental well-being of young people than traditional bullying. 39
Social media use may also have a negative effect on users’
nutritional habits, cognitive efficiency, and sleep patterns. One study
found that using Instagram had a significant relationship to
symptoms of Orthorexia Nervosa, a type of eating disorder in which a
person becomes so obsessed with eating healthy that it can lead to
“significant dietary restrictions [and] malnutrition.” 40 The study’s
researchers posited that social media “encourages selective exposure,
as users choose which accounts they wish to follow, and so are then
continually exposed to the type of content these accounts produce.
This limited exposure in turn may lead to users believing a behaviour
is more prevalent or normal than is actually the case . . . .”41 Social
media use may also impact a person’s memory, 42 and addictive-like
social media use by teenagers also correlates to increased attention

37 JEAN M. TWENGE, IGEN 104 (2017).
38 Id. at 102–03.
39 See Mitch van Geel, Paul Vedder & Jenny Tanilon, Relationship Between Peer
Victimization, Cyberbullying, and Suicide in Children and Adolescents: A Meta-Analysis, 168
JAMA PEDIATRICS 435, 438 (2014) (finding that young victims of cyberbullying were three
times as likely to entertain suicidal ideations as compared to traditional bullying victims
who were only two times as likely); George Kritsotakis, Maria Papanikolaou, Emmanouil
Androulakis & Anastas E. Philalithis, Associations of Bullying and Cyberbullying with Substance
Use and Sexual Risk Taking in Young Adults, 49 J. NURSING SCHOLARSHIP 360, 364 (2017)
(finding that females who were victims of cyberbullying in middle or high school had
higher odds for drug use and males who were cyberbully victims were more prone to
smoke).
40 Pixie G. Turner & Carmen E. Lefevre, Instagram Use is Linked to Increased Symptoms
of Orthorexia Nervosa, 22 EATING & WEIGHT DISORDERS 277, 279, 281 (2017).
41 Id. at 282.
42 See Neika Sharifian & Laura B. Zahodne, Social Media Bytes: Daily Associations
Between Social Media Use and Everyday Memory Failures Across the Adult Life Span, 75 J.
GERONTOLOGY, SERIES B: PSYCH. SCIS. & SOC. SCIS. 540, 540 (2020) (finding that on days
when a user’s “social media use was high, individuals reported more memory failures” and
“higher previous-day social media use was associated with more memory failures on the
subsequent day”).
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deficits later on. 43 Excessive social media use can also negatively
impact a teenager’s sleep habits. 44 A study found that teenagers who
used social media daily were nineteen percent more likely to not get
the proper amount of sleep for their age. 45
Beyond the serious effects social media use might have on
mental and physical health, social media platforms also expose
teenagers to mature and explicit content. The degree of exposure to
mature content is amplified by social media companies’
sophisticated, interest-based algorithms that predict and deliver
related content to the user. 46 The WSJ found that “TikTok can
quickly drive minors—among the biggest users of the app—into
endless spools of content about sex and drugs.” 47 Albeit not
scientific, the WSJ conducted an experiment on TikTok to test how
the algorithms curated adult content for teenage users. 48 For the
experiment, the WSJ created dozens of automated accounts that were
registered as thirteen-to-fifteen-year-olds and searched different adult
material on the app to see what TikTok’s “powerful algorithms”
curated for a hypothetical teenage user. 49 The results were troubling.
One thirteen-year-old’s account was shown “569 videos about drug
use, references to cocaine and meth addiction, and promotional
videos for online sales of drug products and paraphernalia.” 50 The
algorithm also displayed more than “100 videos from accounts
recommending paid pornography sites and sex shops. Thousands of
[other videos] were from creators who labeled their content as for
adults only.”51 A study published in 2020 found that adolescents who
spent an hour on social media generated more positive social views of
43 See Maartje Boer, Gonneke Stevens, Catrin Finkenauer & Regina van den Eijnden,
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder-Symptoms, Social Media Use Intensity, and Social Media
Use Problems in Adolescents: Investigating Directionality, 91 CHILD DEV. e853, e854, e860, e864
(2020). This longitudinal study of eleven-to-fifteen-year-old adolescents also found that
this correlation was “unidirectional” in that increased attention deficits did not lead to an
increase in social media use problems. See id. at e863–64.
44 See TWENGE, supra note 37, at 113 (“Many iGen’ers are so addicted to social media
that they find it difficult to put down their phones and go to sleep when they should.”).
45 See id. at 115.
46 See Sang Ah Kim, Note, Social Media Algorithms: Why You See What You See, 2 GEO.
L. TECH. REV. 147, 148–151 (2017) (explaining generally how social media algorithms
work and their purpose within social media platforms’ business models).
47 Rob Barry, Georgia Wells, John West, Joanna Stern & Jason French, How TikTok
Serves up Sex and Drug Videos to Minors, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/tiktok-algorithm-sex-drugs-minors-11631052944
[https://perma.cc/7HZ4C3V5].
48 See id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. (emphasis added).
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alcohol consumption and subsequently used alcohol more than
adolescents who watched an hour of television. 52 Moreover, social
media posts of young people with alcohol are overwhelmingly
displayed in a positive manner. 53
Although this Section has outlined some of the most serious
documented harms tied to teenage social media use, it is unfair to
hold that social media is entirely destructive. Like many technologies
in the modern world, social media can provide benefits to users as
well. Social media can leave teenagers feeling more connected to
friends, catalyze interactions with diverse people, and provide a sense
of support in difficult times. 54 A survey found that twenty-four
percent of teenage girls who participate in online groups find that
these groups play a “major role in helping them get through tough
times” compared to only fourteen percent of males. 55 Teenagers
have also leveraged social media to grow their own businesses, 56 and
have utilized platforms to organize global advocacy movements. 57
However, it is still contested whether these benefits outweigh the
harms. 58

52 See Elroy Boers, Mohammad H. Afzali & Patricia Conrod, A Longitudinal Study on
the Relationship Between Screen Time and Adolescent Alcohol Use: The Mediating Role of Social
Norms, PREVENTATIVE MED., Mar. 2020, at 1, 4–5.
53 See Hanneke Hendricks, Bas Van den Putte, Winifred A. Gebhardt & Megan A.
Moreno, Social Drinking on Social Media: Content Analysis of the Social Aspects of Alcohol-Related
Posts on Facebook and Instagram, J. MED. INTERNET RSCH., June 2018, at 206, 206 (finding in
one study that ninety-seven percent of alcohol posts “depict alcohol in a positive social
context”).
54 See MONICA ANDERSON & JINGJING JIANG, PEW RSCH. CTR., TEENS’ SOCIAL MEDIA
HABITS AND EXPERIENCES 2–3 (2018) (finding that, of teenagers ages thirteen-toseventeen-years-old, 81% feel social media makes them “more connected to their friends,”
69% think social media helps them “interact with a more diverse group of people,” and
68% “feel as if they have people who will support them through tough times”).
55 See id. at 18.
56 See Savannah Sicurella, When Second Hand Becomes Vintage: Gen Z Has Made
Thrifting a Big Business, NPR (June 18, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/18
/1006207991/when-second-hand-becomes-vintage-gen-z-has-made-thrifting-a-big-business
[https://perma.cc/BA6D-RATE] (highlighting how teenagers and early twentysomethings are using social media and other apps to promote and sell thrifted clothes).
57 See Greta Thunberg (@gretathunberg), INSTAGRAM (Nov. 12, 2021), http://
www.instagram.com/p/CWKtsTZMOZt [https://perma.cc/X3WZ-XCVU].
58 See Cal Newport, The Question We’ve Stopped Asking About Teen-Agers and Social
Media, NEW YORKER (Nov. 9, 2021), https://newyorker.com/culture/office-space/thequestion-weve-stopped-asking-about-teen-agers-and-social-media [https://perma.cc/B4AVNFU5] (highlighting the division among scholars and pundits about research on social
media and its harms on teenagers).
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B. Regulation over “Freedom-of-Choice”
Lawmakers’ assertions that social media platforms should be
regulated like Big Tobacco may seem like a drastic step. A simple
alternative is to encourage teenagers who do not want to expose
themselves to social media’s harms to remove themselves from the
platforms. After all, no one is forcing them to use the product. A
similar argument regarding cigarettes emerged from the tobacco
industry in the mid 1970s. 59 This “freedom-of-choice” rhetoric
emphasizes the value of consumer choice as essential to liberty, and it
is a prominent defense that the tobacco companies have also used for
decades. 60 However, such arguments are not as convincing when they
are applied to teenage decisionmaking. 61 While some teenagers may
have the maturity and capacity to remove themselves from social
media and its potentially harmful effects, adolescent biology is
working against them. Daniel Aaron, an attorney at the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), summarizes the scientific research on
why freedom-of-choice arguments should not apply to teenagers as it
pertains to tobacco use:
Freedom-of-choice arguments become weaker on learning that
most tobacco use begins under age 18. It is well accepted that
youth do not possess the same levels of self-control, knowledge
about the world, or maturity to act in their best interest. Arguably,
the reason that most tobacco use starts before age 18 (and
especially before age 26) is a fundamentally human and biological
lack of brain maturity . . . . During the teenage years and beyond,
there are three important brain changes worth highlighting. The
first is resistance to peer pressure, which has a critical learning
period between the ages 14 and 18. However, this resistance
continues to be developed into college years and beyond. The
second change is development of the pre-frontal cortex, which is
responsible for higher-order thinking, planning, and impulse
inhibition; the pre-frontal cortex is only half-developed by age 18.
Third, the brain’s reward system accelerates in the teenage years
and reaches an adult level around age 25. 62

The “Facebook Files” revealed that Facebook is well aware that
its products are practically irresistible to teenagers. 63 A researcher at
59 See Pamela Mejia, Lori Dorfman, Andrew Cheyne, Laura Nixon, Lissy Friedman,
Mark Gottlieb & Richard Daynard, The Origins of Personal Responsibility Rhetoric in News
Coverage of the Tobacco Industry, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1048, 1048 (2014).
60 See Daniel G. Aaron, Tobacco Reborn: The Rise of E-Cigarettes and Regulatory
Approaches, 25 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 827, 875–76 (2021).
61 See id. at 878.
62 Id. at 878–79 (footnotes omitted).
63 See Wells et al., supra note 8.
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Facebook, in summarizing the company’s research for fellow
colleagues, stated that “[t]eens told us that they don’t like the
amount of time they spend on the app but feel like they have to be
present.” 64 The researcher also noted that teens “often feel
‘addicted’ and know that what they’re seeing is bad for their mental
health but feel unable to stop themselves.” 65 Internal Facebook
anecdotes like this are especially concerning when coupled with
research that demonstrates that adolescents are sixty-six percent
more likely to have one “suicide-related” outcome if they spend five
hours or more a day on electronic devices as opposed to adolescents
who spend one hour a day. 66
Moreover, social media companies are some of the wealthiest
companies in the world, 67 and their business models rely on inducing
users to spend as much time as possible on their platforms. 68 In an
interview for the documentary The Social Dilemma, Justin Rosenstein—
a former Facebook Engineer—bluntly said, “[w]e’re the product.
Our attention is the product, being sold to advertisers.” 69 Sean
Parker, the first president of Facebook, was also forthright about
Facebook’s business model and strategy. He said:
The thought process that went into building these applications . . .
was all about: ‘How do we consume as much of your time and
conscious attention as possible?’ . . . [W]e need[ed] to sort of give
you a little dopamine hit every once in a while . . . . And that’s
going to get you to contribute more content . . . . [We were]
exploiting a vulnerability in human psychology. 70

Tim Kendall—a former executive at Facebook—explained
Facebook’s strategy was to “figure out how to get as much of [the
user’s] attention as we possibly can. How much time can we get you
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See Twenge et al., supra note 26.
67 See Salvador Rodriguez, Facebook Closes Above $1 Trillion Market Cap for the First
Time, CNBC (June 28, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/28/facebook-hits-trilliondollar-market-cap-for-first-time.html [https://perma.cc/TRW2-E2LV]; Jeran Wittenstein,
Snap Hits $100-Billion Market Value After Doubling in Four Months, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 22,
2021), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-02-22/snap-hits-100-billion-marketvalue [https://perma.cc/P6WA-AN8N].
68 See Kim, supra note 46, at 147–48 (“[S]ocial media companies derive profit from
having users stay ‘engaged’ on their platform. . . . The longer a user stays engaged, the
more exposure advertisements receive.”).
69 THE SOCIAL DILEMMA 14:11–14:20 (Netflix 2020).
70 Mike Allen, Sean Parker Unloads on Facebook: “God Only Knows What It’s Doing to Our
Children’s Brains”, AXIOS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.axios.com/sean-parker-unloads-onfacebook-god-only-knows-what-its-doing-to-our-childrens-brains-1513306792-f855e7b44e99-4d60-8d51-2775559c2671.html [https://perma.cc/2HWW-NAN8] (quoting Sean
Parker, former president of Facebook).
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to spend? How much of your life can we get you to give to us?” 71 In
order to accomplish this goal, social media companies rely on teams
of engineers and designers to leverage behavioral psychology to make
their platforms as addicting as possible to users. 72
Teenagers’ diminished ability to resist the addicting features of
social media, combined with social media companies’ business
model, is concerning enough. However, it gets worse. Social media
companies like Facebook need teenage users and will spend hundreds
of millions of dollars in advertising to lure them to their platforms.73
According to an internal marketing presentation, Facebook views the
loss of teenage users as an “existential threat.” 74 The company even
planned to release a version of Instagram for preteens as part of a
strategy to introduce Facebook products to younger users before they
were enticed by competing platforms like Snapchat or TikTok. 75 This
strategy of targeting young users is also a common strategy for
tobacco companies. 76 Tobacco companies understand that it is the
youth who “represent the next generation of adult smokers.” 77
Similarly, social media companies understand that getting younger
users addicted to their products early is vital to their long-term

71 THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 69, at 13:52–14:05.
72 See id. at 26:48–27:02 (highlighting a former Google designer explaining how tech
companies use behavior psychology to make their platforms as addicting as possible); see
also Kim, supra note 46, at 148 (“To keep users engaged for as long and as frequently as
possible, social media platforms want to make their news feeds interesting and relatable to
users.”); Haley Sweetland Edwards, You’re Addicted to Your Smartphone. This Company Thinks
It Can Change That, TIME (Apr. 13, 2018), https://time.com/5237434/youre-addicted-toyour-smartphone-this-company-thinks-it-can-change-that/
[https://perma.cc/TD5MHRG2] (“Every major consumer tech company operating today . . . uses some form of
persuasive technology. Most of the time, the goal is unambiguous: the companies want to
get us to spend as much time as possible on their platforms.”).
73 See Sheera Frenkel, Ryan Mac & Mike Isaac, Instagram Struggles with Fears of Losing
Its ‘Pipeline’: Young Users, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10
/16/technology/instagram-teens.html [https://perma.cc/VH25-J5F6].
In 2018,
Facebook planned to use almost its entire global marketing budget to target teenagers.
Id.
74 Id. (quoting an internal Facebook marketing presentation).
75 See Georgia Wells & Jeff Horwitz, Facebook’s Effort to Attract Preteens Goes Beyond
Instagram Kids, Documents Show, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/facebook-instagram-kids-tweens-attract-11632849667
[https://perma.cc/LYW7-4Y5A].
Facebook went so far as to explore whether “playdates” could be a “growth lever” for their
products. See id.
76 See Aaron, supra note 60, at 884 (“Youth are impressionable. Youth are targeted
by tobacco companies. And it is during youth that most tobacco use begins.”).
77 Id. at 880; see also id. at 880–85 (citing internal tobacco company documents that
demonstrate the importance of getting young users addicted to tobacco products and
highlighting the importance of marketing traditional and e-cigarettes to young people).
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financial prosperity. 78 Because young Americans may not have the
capacity to resist using social media platforms—and social media
companies have a strong monetary interest ensuring teenagers
engage with their products as much as possible despite the potential
risks—it is reasonable for lawmakers to pursue a regulatory scheme in
order to protect young users from the dangers of social media. But
does the tobacco regulatory scheme offer an effective regulatory
blueprint, as lawmakers, tech titans, and academics seem to suggest?
II.

THE TOBACCO REGULATORY SCHEME, PAST AND PRESENT
A. Federal Tobacco Regulation from 1964 to 1995

The tobacco regulatory scheme in the United States is both
storied and multifaceted. 79 In 1964, after years of scientific debate
and efforts by the tobacco industry to undermine medical research, 80
the Surgeon General published Smoking and Health: Report of the
Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service. 81
The advisory committee, which consisted of ten medical experts, took
two years to review comprehensive studies on the effects of smoking
and compile the findings into a foundational report. 82
The
committee found that “[c]igarette smoking is causally related to lung
cancer . . . the magnitude of the effect of cigarette smoking far
78 See Wells & Horwitz, supra note 75 (“Inside [Facebook], teams of employees have
for years been laying plans to attract preteens . . . spurred by fear that Facebook could lose
a new generation of users critical to its future.”).
79 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (“Owing
to its unique place in American history and society, tobacco has its own unique political
history.”), superseded by Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No.
111-31, div. A, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21
U.S.C.). See generally ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND
DEADLY PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA (2007) (documenting the
development of tobacco regulatory scheme throughout the twentieth century).
80 See generally BRANDT, supra note 79, at 159–207 (discussing early medical studies in
the 1950s which showed a correlative connection between smoking and disease and the
tobacco industry’s attempts to undermine such findings).
81 SURGEON GEN.’S ADVISORY COMM. ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964)
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT].
82 See id. at 7–9; BRANDT, supra note 79, at 219–230 (summarizing the formation and
research approach of the advisory committee). The committee explained that the most
significant evidence of the effects of smoking on human health were found “through
clinical and pathological observations of conditions occurring in men, women, and
children in the course of their lives, and by the application of epidemiological and
statistical methods by which a vast array of information has been assembled and analyzed.”
SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 81, at 6 (emphasis added).
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outweighs all other factors.”83 Additionally, the report highlighted
that smoking causes a plethora of other diseases, including chronic
bronchitis, emphysema, cardiovascular diseases, peptic ulcers, and lip
and esophagus cancers. 84 Ultimately, the report declared that
“[c]igarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in
the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.” 85
A year after the Surgeon General’s report, Congress passed the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA). 86 The
FCLAA declared it “unlawful for any person to manufacture, import,
or package for sale or distribution within the United States any
cigarettes the package of which fails to bear the following statement:
‘Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health.’” 87
The Act required that “[s]uch statement shall be located in a
conspicuous place on every cigarette package and shall appear in
conspicuous and legible type in contrast by typography, layout, or
color with other printed matter on the package.”88 One of the stated
purposes of the FCLAA was to protect “commerce and the national
economy” from “diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations.” 89 Therefore, Congress sought
to preempt any state or federal agency from requiring different
advertising or labeling restrictions. 90
Approximately four years after the passage of the FCLAA,
Congress passed the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969
(PHCSA). 91 Unlike the watered-down warning language of the
83 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 81, at 31.
84 Id. at 31–32, 337. The committee found the only benefit that smoking might
provide was in the area of contentment as it pertains to mental health. Id. at 32.
However, the committee found “no basis for a judgment which would weigh benefits
against [the] hazards of smoking as it may apply to the general population.” Id.
85 Id. at 33.
86 See Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79
Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 1331–1338). However, the tobacco industry
had a strong influence throughout the lawmaking process. See BRANDT, supra note 79, at
256 (“[The FCLAA] emerged from Congress bearing the fingerprints of the tobacco
industry and its remarkably able, if heavy handed, lobby.”).
87 Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act of 1965 § 4. The required language
was far less forceful than the findings of the Surgeon General’s report. The use of “may
be” in the warning “made it a warning in name only, all but officially retracting the
findings of the surgeon general’s committee.” BRANDT, supra note 79, at 256.
88 Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act of 1965 § 4.
89 Id. § 2.
90 See id. § 5. This preemption led to the Supreme Court striking down a
Massachusetts statute that placed restrictions on the proximity of cigarette advertisements
to places such as parks and schools. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525
(2001).
91 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1339).
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FCLAA, the PHCSA mandated that all cigarette packages must be
labeled with the phrase: “Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your
Health.” 92 However, the PHSCA maintained the FCLAA’s mandated
style and layout of the warning label. 93
Over the next two decades, Congress passed a few other notable
pieces of federal legislation. Congress enacted the Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act of 1984 (CSEA) with the express aim of
“making Americans more aware of any adverse health effects of
smoking.”94 Additionally, the CSEA expanded mandated warning
labels to both advertisements and to outdoor billboards. 95 In 1986,
Congress extended many of the requirements of the CSEA and the
FLCAA to smokeless tobacco through the Comprehensive Smokeless
Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986. 96
The 1990s ushered in increased federal involvement in tobacco
regulation at the state level. The Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental
Health Administration Reorganization Act of 1992 incentivized states
to enforce minimum age requirements on tobacco products by
offering grant funding for special prevention programs. 97 This
incentive worked, and by 1993 every U.S. state had increased its
minimum age requirement to at least eighteen years old. 98

92 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 4.
93 Compare Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act of 1965 § 4, with Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 4.
94 Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 2, 98 Stat. 2200,
2200 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1331). The Act funded and streamlined
further research on the effects of cigarette smoking and provided cigarette companies
with four options for the mandated warning labels on their products. See Comprehensive
Smoking Education Act §§ 3(a)–(b), 4(a)(1).
The options were: “SURGEON
GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And
May Complicate Pregnancy”; “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Quitting Smoking
Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health”; “SURGEON GENERAL’S
WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth,
And Low Birth Weight”; “SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains
Carbon Monoxide.” Comprehensive Smoking Education Act § 4(a).
95 See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act § 4.
96 See Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 4401–4408).
97 See Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act,
Pub. L. No. 102-321, § 202, 106 Stat. 323, 394 (1992) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 300x-26) (“[T]he Secretary [of Health and Human Services] may make a grant . . . only
if the State involved has . . . a law providing that it is unlawful for any manufacturer,
retailer, or distributor of tobacco products to sell or distribute any such product to any
individual under the age of 18.”).
98 Dorie E. Apollonio & Stanton A. Glantz, Minimum Ages of Legal Access for Tobacco in
the United States from 1863 to 2015, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1200, 1204 (2016).
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B. The FDA Attempts to Take Charge
In 1996, the FDA issued a final rule entitled “Regulations
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents.”99 The rule was an
attempt by the FDA to assert jurisdiction over tobacco products and
tobacco advertisements. 100 The FDA determined that “cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco are intended to affect the structure or function of
the body, within the meaning of the [Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938’s] definitions of ‘drug’ and ‘device.’” 101
The final rule prohibited the sale of tobacco products to persons
under the age of eighteen, required tobacco retailers to verify a
buyer’s age by a photo ID, and forbade free samples of tobacco
products or the use of vending machines to sell tobacco products in
establishments where people under the age of eighteen were
allowed. 102 In justifying its decision to regulate tobacco, the FDA
stated that it determined the “restrictions to reduce the use of
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco by individuals under the age of 18
while leaving these products on the market for adults—is the
available option that is the most consistent with both the [FDCA] and
the agency’s mission to protect the public health.” 103
However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the FDA’s selfperceived power to regulate tobacco. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., the Court held—in a 5–4 decision—that Congress
“clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco products.” 104 In writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor
noted that “Congress, for better or for worse, has created a distinct
regulatory scheme for tobacco products . . . and repeatedly acted to
preclude any agency from exercising significant policy-making
99 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
100 Id. at 44,396–97.
101 Id. at 44,397; see also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717,
52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 127–29 (1999) (summarizing the
FDA’s approach and justification for establishing its final rule to regulate tobacco),
superseded by Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.); C.
STEPHEN REDHEAD & VANESSA BURROWS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32619, FDA REGULATION
OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS: A POLICY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 (2007) (outlining the statutory
justification that the FDA relied on in its issuance of the final rule in 1996).
102 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,399.
103 Id. at 44,398.
104 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126.
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authority in the area.”105 The Court found that Congress had
enacted six statutes since 1965 concerning tobacco regulation
“against the backdrop of the FDA’s consistent and repeated
statements that it lacked authority” to regulate tobacco. 106 Moreover,
Congress had rejected bills that would have given the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco regulation. 107 After the Supreme Court eviscerated
the FDA’s perceived power to regulate the tobacco industry, it
became clear that it would be the responsibility of Congress to
spearhead any amendments to the federal regulatory scheme. 108
Nine years after the Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., Congress finally responded by passing the
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) in June
2009. 109 The TCA explicitly provides the FDA with the authority to
regulate tobacco products pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and recognized the agency as “the primary Federal
regulatory authority with respect to the manufacture, marketing, and
distribution of tobacco products.” 110 Congress’s intent to prevent
young people from using tobacco is unequivocal. The first stated
finding of the TCA reads, “[t]he use of tobacco products by the
Nation’s children is a pediatric disease of considerable proportions
that results in new generations of tobacco-dependent children and
adults.” 111 Moreover, the second stated purpose of the Act was to
ensure that the FDA “has the authority to address issues of particular
concern to public health officials, especially the use of tobacco by
young people.” 112 Congress noted that reducing minors’ tobacco use
by fifty percent would prevent “10,000,000 of today’s children from
becoming regular, daily smokers, saving over 3,000,000 of them from
premature death” and save over seventy-five billion dollars in
healthcare costs. 113 The passage of the TCA marked a significant new
assertion of tobacco regulation by the federal government and its

105 Id. at 159–160.
106 Id. at 144.
107 See id.; see also id. at 125 (“Regardless of how serious the problem an
administrative agency seeks to address, however, it may not exercise its authority ‘in a
manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress enacted into
law.’” (quoting ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 517 (1988))).
108 See REDHEAD & BURROWS, supra note 101, at 10 (noting that no new authority to
regulate tobacco will be granted to the FDA “unless Congress enacts legislation to give the
agency unambiguous statutory authority over such products”).
109 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123
Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.).
110 Id. § 3(1).
111 Id. § 2(1).
112 Id. § 3(2).
113 Id. § 2(14).
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executive agency, the FDA. 114 The TCA is a culmination of decades
of legislation and litigation, 115 and supplements tobacco legislation
from the latter half of the twentieth century in order to create a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. 116
C. The Current Regulatory Landscape
The main provisions of the federal tobacco regulatory scheme
are found in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1341 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 387–387u.
There are four main categories of the current federal tobacco
regulatory scheme intended to prevent minors from using tobacco
products that could also apply to a social media regulatory scheme:
(1) age restrictions on access, (2) mandated health warnings, (3)
research and mandated information collection, and (4) product
safety standards. 117 For the purposes of this paper, I will analyze the
technical and legal implications of the first two categories. 118
1. Age Restrictions on Tobacco Use
Pursuant to its granted authority under the TCA, the FDA
established rules “in order to reduce the number of children and
adolescents who use [tobacco] products.” 119 Under the FDA’s rule,
tobacco retailers play a major role as intermediaries in preventing
minors from accessing tobacco. 120 The FDA requires that no retailer

114 See Ricardo Carvajal, David Clissold & Jeffrey Shapiro, The Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act: An Overview, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 717, 717 (2009)
(“[T]he [TCA] marks a dramatic shift in the relationship between the federal
government and the tobacco industry.”); Arlen W. Langvardt, Tobacco Advertising and the
First Amendment: Striking the Right Balance, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 331, 411 (2014)
(“[T]he TCA marked a significant expansion and ramping-up of the government’s
regulatory regime.”).
115 See Aaron, supra note 60, at 833 (“The [TCA] was the culmination of a decadelong legal battle over the future of tobacco.” (footnote omitted)).
116 See Langvardt, supra note 114, at 411 (explaining that the TCA was not the
government’s first attempt to regulate health warnings and advertisements).
117 Each state also has its own tobacco regulations—especially as it pertains to
taxation on tobacco products. See The Tax Burden on Tobacco, 1970–2019, CDC, https://
chronicdata.cdc.gov/Policy/The-Tax-Burden-on-Tobacco-1970-2019/7nwe-3aj9/data
[https://perma.cc/QGP3-S5VE] (compiling the tax burden on tobacco in all fifty states
from 1970 to 2019).
118 Analyzing the other two provisions would be impractical given the current lack of
evidence establishing the government’s interest in regulating social media to protect
teenagers as I will demonstrate in Part III. Moreover, instead of analyzing the third
category, I recommend that this category should be the first step in bolstering the
government’s social media regulatory scheme as demonstrated in Part IV.
119 21 C.F.R. § 1140.2 (2021).
120 See id. § 1140.14(a)(1).
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sell tobacco products to anyone under eighteen, 121 and retailers must
also verify a purchaser’s age through valid photo identification that
includes a date of birth for any purchaser who looks under the age of
twenty-six. 122 Additionally, the FDA requires that retailers may only
sell cigarettes “face-to-face . . . without the assistance of any electronic
or mechanical device.” 123 In 2019, Congress raised the mandatory
minimum age to twenty-one years old, making it illegal for any
American under the age of twenty-one to buy any tobacco products—
including hookah, e-cigarettes, and cigars. 124
2. Mandated Health Warnings
Perhaps the most controversial portions of the tobacco
regulatory scheme are its restrictions on labeling. 125 The TCA
requires tobacco manufacturers to place one of nine warning labels
on tobacco packaging, and the Act mandates that these warnings
rotate quarterly. 126 Tobacco companies are also required to submit a
plan to the Secretary of Health and Human Services on how they will
rotate the different warning labels. 127 In addition to new warnings,
the TCA established even more specific display requirements for the
mandated labels and for advertisements. 128 Among the mandates, the
TCA establishes exact font sizes for warning labels and
advertisements, the color of the font and background of the labels,
and the proportion of the space on a package or label that must be
dedicated to the warning. 129 The TCA also requires the inclusion of
“color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of
smoking to accompany the label statements,” and the content of
these graphics are at the discretion of the FDA. 130
121 See id. The age limit was raised to twenty-one in 2019. See infra note 124.
122 21 C.F.R § 1140.14(a)(2)(i)–(ii).
123 Id. § 1140.14(a)(3). There is an exception to this rule for establishments that
never allow minors to enter the premises. See id. § 1140.16(c)(2)(ii).
124 See Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, § 603(a),
133 Stat. 2534, 3123 (2019) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387f(d)).
125 See Carvajal et al., supra note 114, at 731 (“The statutory restrictions [of the TCA]
so impinge upon a manufacturer’s ability to market and promote new tobacco
products . . . that they have prompted litigation challenging their constitutionality.”).
126 See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1), (c)(2) (2018); Langvardt, supra note 114, at 347
(“These warnings preserve the general thrust of the rotating warnings previously
required, but the new list expands the number of warnings in the rotation.”).
127 See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(c)(2).
128 See id. § 1333(a)(2), (b)(1)–(3), (c)(1)–(2), (d).
129 See id. § 1333(a)(2), (b)(2).
130 See id. § 1333(d). These graphics became a significant factor in challenging the
legality of these warning and advertising mandates. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA,
696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (finding that the FDA did not provide sufficient
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The next Part explores the technical possibilities and legal
challenges of applying these two categories of the tobacco regulatory
scheme to social media companies for the purpose of protecting
American adolescents.
III.

ADOPTING A SOCIAL MEDIA REGULATORY FRAMEWORK BASED ON
THE TOBACCO REGULATORY SCHEME

Regarding tobacco regulations, Congress maintains that it is
imperative that “commerce and the national economy may be (A)
protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy
and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing
cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any
relationship between smoking and health.” 131 An effective social
media regulatory scheme would also likely have to be federal in
nature. With fifty distinct state jurisdictions in the United States, a
patchwork approach would likely undermine the statutory schemes of
states that attempt to regulate teenage social media use. 132 For
instance, through a virtual private network (VPN), a teenager in state
X, where there are strict social media regulations for teenagers, could
access a social media site by pretending to be in state Y, rendering
state X’s regulatory scheme virtually meaningless. 133 Therefore, this
analysis will focus solely on a federal regulatory scheme.
evidence that graphic images would reduce smoking); see infra notes 210–24 and
accompanying text.
131 See 15 U.S.C. § 1331(2).
132 Senator Blumenthal, when he was the Attorney General of Connecticut,
recognized the difficulty that the internet imposed on state-level enforcement regimes
regarding adolescent tobacco use. He argued that:
[H]igher taxes do not address a growing problem—increasing sales through
mail order of cigarettes and tobacco products, especially over the Internet.
These sales raise two profound concerns: uncontrolled youth access and evasion
of state taxes. The access problem is obvious—many children have easy access
to the Internet, and our investigations . . . have shown that Internet tobacco
sales outlets almost never make a meaningful effort to enforce age restrictions.
In addition, these outlets generally neither sell properly taxed cigarettes nor
properly report their sales to state taxing authorities. While it is unclear how
many children are ordering cigarettes over the Internet, we know anecdotally
how easily kids can purchase them. We also know that some illegal bulk
Internet purchasers have made their untaxed purchases for the purpose of
illegal resale, and those persons are likely to be just as willing to sell to minors as
they are to break other laws.
Richard Blumenthal, Commentary, Tobacco Control: A State Perspective, 3 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 151, 154 (2002).
133 See Max Eddy, What Is a VPN, and Why You Need One, PCMAG (Aug. 12, 2021),
https://www.pcmag.com/how-to/what-is-a-vpn-and-why-you-need-one [https://perma.cc
/AEV8-CZH6] (“With a VPN, you can connect to a server in a different country and spoof
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A. Barring Teenage Access to Social Media
In order to prevent teenagers from accessing and consuming
tobacco products, the tobacco regulatory scheme requires purchasers
to present valid government identification. 134 If a purchaser is not
twenty-one, they are completely forbidden from purchasing tobacco
in the United States. 135 While effective for preventing access to a
physical product like tobacco, applying a similar age restriction to
social media is more complicated. Major social media companies
allow a user to choose their age when making an account and do not
verify that the user is telling the truth. 136 Therefore, in order to
create an effective restriction on social media access for teenagers,
social media companies will need to institute a more robust age
verification process. However, doing so could create both technical
and legal challenges.
Requiring social media users to verify their age through official
forms of identification is the most analogous to the tobacco
regulatory scheme. From a technical perspective, verifying a user’s
age in order to restrict access to social media platforms is now
possible. 137 Unlike the tobacco regulatory scheme—which places the
responsibility on the intermediary-retailer to enforce age restrictions
on tobacco access—an age restriction on social media would likely be
enforced by the social media companies themselves. 138 Other
your location. If you’re outside the US, you can VPN back to a familiar location and
access the internet (mostly) as usual. You can also do it in reverse. From the comfort of
your home, you can pop over to a far-away VPN server, perhaps to access streaming video
unavailable in the US.”).
134 See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
135 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
136 See Pavni Diwanji, How Do We Know Someone Is Old Enough to Use Our Apps?, META
(July 27, 2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/07/age-verification/ [https://
perma.cc/9WKR-667G]; see also FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/signup [https://
perma.cc/8WUN-PTQW];
TIKTOK,
https://www.tiktok.com/signup/phone-or-email
[https://perma.cc/4KXY-J3SL].
137 See David McCabe, Anonymity No More? Age Checks Come to the Web, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/27/technology/internet-age-checkproof.html [https://perma.cc/K7KB-S3G3].
138 Under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), social media
platforms already must regulate based on the age of users. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506
(2018). However, instead of verifying the age of users under thirteen and following the
provisions of COPPA, some social media companies simply restrict users under thirteen
from using any of their services. See Shannon Finnegan, Comment, How Facebook Beat the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act: A Look into the Continued Ineffectiveness of COPPA and
How to Hold Social Media Sites Accountable in the Future, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 827, 828
(2020) (“[Facebook has] effectively managed to circumvent the requirements imposed on
websites under COPPA by simply banning users under the age of thirteen from their
websites. This restriction does not adequately prevent children from accessing their
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countries already require that certain websites verify a user’s age
through government identification. 139 American companies like
Google and Tinder are complying with these mandates abroad. 140
Meta 141 has created a mechanism through Instagram to verify
and store the identification of suspicious users. 142 The company
verifies accounts that it deems to be suspicious by requesting government issued identification, or a combination of other identifying
material, in order to authenticate a user’s identity. 143 Instagram
explains that in most cases a user will “need to provide [Instagram] a
copy of something with your full name and photo on it or something
that includes your full name and indicates your age.” 144 While
assuring users that it doesn’t intend for identity verification to impact
more than a small number of its users, 145 Instagram’s policy proves
that it is capable of collecting and verifying the identities and ages of
its users. However, Meta also announced that instead of collecting
and verifying users’ IDs, it is pursuing a verification scheme built on
artificial intelligence. 146 According to the company, this technology
will scan for multiple signals that a user is under eighteen years old
despite the age they reported when they made their account. 147

websites.” (footnote omitted)). But see Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot.,
Product Safety & Data Sec. of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 117th Cong. (Oct. 26.
2021) (statement of Michael Beckerman, Vice President and Head of Pub. Pol’y,
Americas, TikTok) [hereinafter Written Statement of Michael Beckerman] (“[I]f an
individual registers for TikTok as under the age of 13, they are directed to TikTok for
Younger Users, a curated viewing experience with stringent safeguards and privacy
protections . . . .”) (this hearing has not been officially published yet, but both the video
recording of the hearing and Mr. Beckerman’s written statement can be found at https://
www.commerce.senate.gov/2021/10/protecting-kids-online-snapchat-tiktok-and-youtube
[https://perma.cc/T48B-7J7T]).
139 See McCabe, supra note 137 (highlighting the use of mandated age verification to
view certain adult material in countries like United Kingdom, Germany, and France).
140 Id. (demonstrating how Google has implemented age verification for adult
material on YouTube in the United Kingdom and Tinder requires age verification in
Japan pursuant to Japanese law).
141 Facebook changed its name to “Meta” in October 2021. See Mike Isaac, Facebook
Renames Itself Meta, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/28
/technology/facebook-meta-name-change.html [https://perma.cc/22M5-JKMF].
142 See Introducing New Authenticity Measures on Instagram, INSTAGRAM (Aug. 13, 2020),
https://about.instagram.com/blog/announcements/introducing-new-authenticitymeasures-on-instagram/ [https://perma.cc/XM6W-CRGU].
143 See id.; What Types of ID Does Instagram Accept?, INSTAGRAM, https://
help.instagram.com/271237319690904/ [https://perma.cc/9WFR-837L].
144 What Types of ID Does Instagram Accept?, supra note 143.
145 See Introducing New Authenticity Measures on Instagram, supra note 142.
146 See Diwanji, supra note 136.
147 Id.
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While age verification is technically possible, absolute restrictions
on teenage access to social media (similar to an absolute restriction
on tobacco) may violate the First Amendment. Unlike access to
tobacco, freedom of speech is a constitutionally protected right. 148
There is no doubt that social media platforms are now a massive
forum for the exchange of ideas and general communication. 149 In
Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that a North
Carolina statute completely barring sex offenders from accessing and
using social media platforms violated their First Amendment rights. 150
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reasoned that “to foreclose
access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging
in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.” 151
In reaching its conclusion, the Packingham Court assumed that
banning sex offenders from accessing social media was a content
neutral restriction on speech; therefore, intermediate scrutiny
applied. 152 But for a statute to survive intermediate scrutiny, it “must
not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further
the government’s legitimate interests.’” 153 Moreover, it is the
government’s burden to prove that statute is “necessary or
legitimate” to government’s purpose. 154 The Court recognized that
child sex abuse is a serious crime, and the North Carolina legislature
had a legitimate interest in protecting children from sexual assault. 155
However, the “assertion of a valid governmental interest ‘cannot, in
every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections.’” 156
Packingham established some degree of a First Amendment right
to access social media. 157 But the Court only held that a complete ban
on access was unconstitutional, “leaving open the questions of how

148 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
149 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (“[Social Media]
websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen
to make his or her voice heard. They allow a person with an Internet connection to
‘become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.’”
(quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997))).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1736.
153 Id. (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 486 (2014)).
154 Id. at 1737.
155 See id. at 1736.
156 Id. (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 563 (1969)).
157 See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1611 (2018) (highlighting that Packingham may
serve as a “new basis to argue that [social media] platforms perform quasi-municipal
functions”).
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robust that access must be or where in the internet pipeline a choke
point must lie in order to abridge a First Amendment right.” 158
Like the North Carolina statute analyzed in Packingham, a statute
that completely excluded teenagers from accessing social media
platforms would likely be constitutionally challenged.
The
Packingham Court found that the statute enacted “a prohibition
unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment speech it
burdens.”159 If a statute that banned twenty thousand people in a
single state from social media access was considered an unprecedented prohibition, 160 it is not unreasonable to assume that a statute
that prohibits over seventy million Americans under the age of
eighteen from any type of access to social media would raise
significant constitutional issues. 161 Moreover, unlike North Carolina’s
substantial government interest in preventing child sex crimes, the
government has yet to demonstrate that (1) social media causes
serious harms to teenagers 162 and (2) the government has a
substantial interest in preventing those harms. Even if the government possessed a legitimate interest in restricting social media use, a
complete ban on teenage access—like a complete ban on tobacco
products—would likely burden far more speech than necessary to
advance the government’s interest. As noted above, social media can
be beneficial to teenagers in certain circumstances 163—unlike
tobacco use—and a complete ban would “bar[] access to what for
many are the principal sources for knowing current events . . .
speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise
exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge.”164

158 Id.; see also Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (“[T]his opinion should not be
interpreted as barring a State from enacting more specific laws than the one at issue.”).
159 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
160 See id. at 1734.
161 See Population Under 18 Years by Age, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov
/cedsci/table?q=under%2018&tid=ACSSE2019.K200102 (last visited Feb. 12, 2022)
(demonstrating the number of Americans under the age of eighteen as of 2019).
162 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text; infra note 229.
163 See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text; see also Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Prot., Product Safety & Data Sec. of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 117th
Cong. (Sept. 30. 2021) (statement of Antigone Davis, Glob. Head of Safety, Facebook)
[hereinafter Written Statement of Antigone Davis] (“Among those teenage girls who said
they had felt sadness in the past month, 57% said Instagram made things better, and 34%
said Instagram had no impact. 9% said Instagram made it worse.”) (this hearing has not
been officially published yet, but both the video recording of the hearing and Ms. Davis’s
written statement can be found at https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2021/9/protectingkids-online-facebook-instagram-and-mental-health-harms
[https://perma.cc/R44P655M]).
164 Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
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However, there is well-established precedent that American
children are not guaranteed the same level of First Amendment
protections as adults. As the Supreme Court held in Prince v.
Massachusetts, the government’s power “to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.” 165 If
the government seeks to only restrict social media access for
Americans under the age of eighteen, this precedent potentially
bolsters the government’s interest in restricting social media use for
all minors. 166
In Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court held that a New York
statute barring the sale of sexually explicit material to minors under
the age of seventeen did not violate the First Amendment. 167 While
the statute effectively limited minors’ access to certain speech, the
Court found that there were two prevailing interests that justified the
state’s power to regulate for “[t]he well-being of its children.” 168
First, the Court held that parents have the authority to “direct the
rearing of their children” and a restriction on access to obscene
material could properly advance the interest of caretakers responsible
for a child’s well-being. 169 Second, the Court found the government
also possesses “an independent interest in the well-being of its
youth.” 170 This interest allows the government to “‘protect the
welfare of children’ and to see that they are ‘safeguarded from
abuses’ which might prevent their ‘growth into free and independent
well-developed men [and women] and citizens.’” 171
The Ginsberg Court determined it only had to analyze whether it
was rational for the New York legislature to conclude that banning
access to obscene material would prevent the “abuse” of the youth. 172
The Court was incredibly deferential to the New York legislature. 173
In justifying the restriction, the Court reasoned it was not necessary
to prove by “scientific fact” that obscene material would impair “the

165 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
166 But see Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir.
2001) (“Now that eighteen-year-olds have the right to vote, it is obvious that they must be
allowed the freedom to form their political views on the basis of uncensored speech before
they turn eighteen, so that their minds are not a blank when they first exercise the
franchise.”).
167 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968).
168 Id. at 639.
169 See id. (“The legislature could properly conclude that parents and others, teachers
for example, who have this primary responsibility for children’s well-being are entitled to
the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.”).
170 Id. at 640.
171 Id. at 640–41 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).
172 See id. at 641.
173 See id. at 641–43.
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ethical and moral development” of young people and create a “clear
and present danger” to New Yorkers. 174 Furthermore, the Court was
untroubled that there were no causative findings that obscene
material harmed children. 175 The majority noted that the “growing
consensus of commentators is that ‘while these studies all agree that a
causal link [between obscene material and harm to children] has not
been demonstrated, they are equally agreed that a causal link has not
been disproved either.’” 176 Instead, the Court noted that—unlike the
content in Meyer v. Nebraska 177—exposing minors to “sex material”
could reasonably be found to be harmful. 178
While Ginsberg may provide the government with more leeway to
inhibit minors’ access to social media, that leeway may be significantly
restrained by marked differences between the New York statute in
Ginsberg and a federal statute barring access to social media. First,
the Ginsberg Court analyzed a law that addressed obscene material—a
category of content that is not protectable under the First
Amendment. 179 A regulation barring minors’ access to social
media—like the complete restriction on tobacco purchases—would
also limit a minor’s access to content that is reasonably not
obscene. 180 Moreover, the New York law Ginsberg analyzed only
prohibited obscene material that was “utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors.”181 While there is obscene material on
social media, 182 a complete restriction would also prohibit minors
from accessing content that arguably has tremendous “redeeming
social importance.” For instance, banning all minors from social
media would prevent them from conveniently interacting with the
content from social advocates like Greta Thunberg 183 or Malala

174 Id. at 641 (quoting N,Y. PENAL LAW § 484-e (McKinney 1965)).
175 See id. at 641–43.
176 Id. at 642 (quoting C. Peter Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 SUP.
CT. REV. 7, 52.)
177 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (holding that children’s exposure to the German
language “cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful”).
178 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.
179 See id.; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“This much has been
categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment.”).
180 For an example of content that is reasonably not obscene, see Geordi La Corgi &
Scotty (@lacorgi), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/lacorgi/ [https://perma.cc
/87DJ-CAJ5] (featuring hundreds of photos of cute Corgis).
181 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646.
182 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
183 See Greta Thunberg (@gretathunberg), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com
/gretathunberg/ [https://perma.cc/MG9W-9CQ4] (documenting the advocacy efforts of
a teenage climate activist).
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Yousafzai. 184 The Ginsberg Court also recognized that prohibiting
sales of sexually explicit material to minors did not ban parents from
purchasing the material for their children and giving it to them. 185 If
Congress enacted a complete access restriction to social media for
minors and did not allow parents to give their children access, that
would be a marked difference from the New York statute and could
be viewed unfavorably by the courts. 186
Furthermore, requiring a robust age verification mechanism on
social media sites could impact American adults’ access to social
media. If every adult must input a government ID to verify their age,
it could restrict many citizens who, for whatever reason, do not have
proper identification for accessing social media sites. 187 Moreover,
VPNs allow minors to access social media platforms from other
countries, therefore social media companies would likely have to
verify every user in every country in order to restrict American minors’
access.
This could have a significant, negative impact on
marginalized populations around the globe. 188 In Butler v. Michigan,
a case decided over a decade before Ginsberg, the Court struck down
a Michigan statute that limited adult access to constitutionally
protected material. 189 The Court held that by limiting adults’ access
to constitutionally protected speech, the law went too far in its efforts
to protect children. 190 As the Butler Court said, “[s]urely, this is to
burn the house to roast the pig.”191 Requiring every user to verify
their age on social media is akin to burning down the house to roast
184 See Malala (@malala), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/malala/ [https://
perma.cc/8HE5-YVJ5] (documenting the advocacy efforts of a girls’ education advocate).
185 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
186 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 865 (1997) (finding that the Communications
Decency Act differed from the New York statute analyzed in Ginsberg in numerous ways,
one being that it impacted the communications and conduct between parents and their
children).
187 This could disproportionately harm minorities in America. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST., CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS’ POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY
PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO IDENTIFICATION 3 (2006) (finding that 25% of votingage African American citizens did not possess a government-issued ID compared to 8% of
white voting-age citizens).
188 See Diwanji, supra note 136 (“ID collection isn’t a fair or equitable solution, nor is
it foolproof. Access to government IDs varies depending on where you live in the world,
as does the information contained in an ID such as a birthday.”); Vyjayanti T. Desai, Anna
Diofasi & Jing Lu, The Global Identification Challenge: Who Are the 1 Billion People Without
Proof of Identity?, WORLD BANK: VOICES (Apr. 25, 2018), https://blogs.worldbank.org
/voices/global-identification-challenge-who-are-1-billion-people-without-proof-identity
[https://perma.cc/4X23-EW3K] (highlighting studies conducted by the World Bank that
find that an estimated one billion people do not have any type of identification).
189 See 352 U.S. 380, 382–84 (1957).
190 See id. at 383–84.
191 Id. at 383.
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the pig, especially given that the government has yet to establish that
social media use poses a significant threat to teenager well-being. 192
The holding in Butler—coupled with Packingham’s recognition of
some degree of a First Amendment right to access social media—
could create significant legal issues for a regulatory scheme because it
would likely require social media companies to verify all users,
regardless of their age.
B. Mandated Warning Labels on Social Media Products
One of the most visible results of the tobacco regulatory scheme
is the proliferation of warning labels on tobacco products and
advertisements. From a technical perspective, it is possible to place
warning labels on a social media platform. Social media companies
could code their products to present a required warning label before
the user begins consuming content or even in while viewing
content. 193 In October 2021, Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok,
began inserting mandatory pauses in users’ video feeds. 194 During
the pause, video messages appear “which remind users to ‘put down
the phone’, ‘go to bed’ or [that they have] ‘work tomorrow.’” 195 The
videos last for five seconds and cannot be skipped. 196 Moreover,
unlike tobacco warning labels that are printed on packaging and
released into the stream of commerce, social media warning labels
could be dynamic and leverage the data social media companies
collect in order to target users with an applicable and impactful
warning message. 197 Social media companies tout how their products

192 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text; infra note 232.
193 Social media companies could treat a mandatory warning like an advertisement
and insert the warning into a user’s feed in a similar manner as an advertisement.
194 See Tracy Qu, TikTok’s China Sibling Douyin Launches Mandatory Five-Second Pauses
in Video Feed to Curb User Addiction, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 22, 2021), https://
www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3153292/tiktoks-china-sibling-douyin-launchesmandatory-five-second-pauses [https://perma.cc/B6SZ-ZSMJ].
195 Id.
196 See id.
197 See Leslie K. John, Tami Kim & Kate Barasz, Ads That Don’t Overstep, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 62, 62–64, (“Research has shown that digital targeting
meaningfully improves the response to advertisements and that ad performance declines
when marketers’ access to consumer data is reduced.”); see also Written Statement of
Antigone Davis, supra note 163, at 2–3 (explaining how Facebook and Instagram can
tailor content based on the age of the user); Written Statement of Michael Beckerman,
supra note 138, at 2 (explaining how TikTok can automatically direct users who search
suicide on the app to specific resources to support them). See generally Small Business:
Advertise, META, https://www.facebook.com/business/small-business/advertise [https://
perma.cc/44LA-2NU3 ] (highlighting how Facebook can collect data on users in order to
deliver impactful messaging and advertising).
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give advertisers robust analytics regarding the effectiveness of their ad
purchases. 198 Similarly, social media companies would be able to
track the deterrent effect of warning labels rather quickly, compared
to complex longitudinal studies of tobacco warning labels which can
lead to spurious results. 199
While technologically possible, requiring warning labels on
social media products will be legally onerous. Two tobacco-related
cases highlight the difficulty regulators will face if they attempt to
enforce a mandatory disclosure regime for social media companies.
After the passage of the TCA, tobacco companies asserted that the
Act’s provision requiring persuasive graphics about the dangers of
smoking on cigarette packaging was a violation of their First
Amendment rights. The two cases, Discount Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc. v United States200 and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 201 led to a
circuit split over which commercial speech test should apply—
ultimately leading one circuit to hold that the provision was legal and
the other to hold the provision was unconstitutional.
In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the Supreme Court’s test
articulated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 202 was applicable
to the mandated graphics on cigarette packaging. 203 Under Zauderer,
198 See TIKTOK FOR BUS., https://www.business-tiktok.com/retargetvisitor/ [https://
perma.cc/U9AC-4YVH] (“TikTok Ads Manager offers you an unmissable opportunity to
engage with your target audience while running [Return On Investment] focussed [sic]
campaigns.”); View Results on Your Facebook Ad in Ads Manager, META, https://
www.facebook.com/business/tools/ads-manager [https://perma.cc/98XH-NF9Y] (select
“Learn more” under “Get real-time insights”) (highlighting all the performance metrics
that Facebook and Instagram can measure, including how an advertisement performs
based on a user’s age and gender).
199 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 716–19 (2012) (highlighting numerous studies of the effectiveness of
warning labels on deterring youth tobacco consumption); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (disparaging Canadian and Australian
studies on the effectiveness of graphic warnings on tobacco packaging by finding that
these studies only demonstrated that they could be correlative rather than causative). The
results from digital social media studies could also be spurious but with the ability to track
behavior in real time on social media platforms, researchers could gain a better
understanding into how delivered warnings impact a user in the immediate moments
after exposure and whether repeated exposure leads to less usage of their accounts.
200 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
201 696 F.3d 1205.
202 See 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
203 Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561. The court emphasized that it did not analyze
the actual content of the graphics chosen by the FDA; instead it analyzed whether any
type of required disclosure in the form of graphics could be legal. See id. at 558–59.
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in order for a required disclosure to be constitutional it must concern
“purely factual and uncontroversial information” and the disclosure
requirements must be “reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers.” 204 First, the Discount Tobacco
court determined that graphic warnings about the harms of tobacco
use could “clearly be a factual and accurate disclosure.” 205 Next, the
court addressed the second step required under Zauderer: whether
“graphic and textual warnings that convey factual information about
the health risks of tobacco use are reasonably related to the purpose
of preventing consumer deception.”206 In finding that the graphic
warnings were reasonably related, the Discount Tobacco court
highlighted the “decades-long” campaign by tobacco companies to
deceive users about the risks of tobacco use. 207 The majority also
pointed to studies that showed traditional warning labels were no
longer as effective in warning users about the dangers of smoking. 208
Moreover, the court pointed to studies in other countries which had
adopted graphic warnings and found “substantial evidence to
support the conclusion that larger warnings incorporating graphics
would promote greater public understanding of the health risks of
using tobacco.”209
Just four months after the Sixth Circuit upheld the TCA’s
required disclosures, the D.C. Circuit struck down the disclosures on
First Amendment grounds in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA. 210
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the R.J. Reynolds court determined that the
Zauderer test was not applicable because the graphic warnings did not
“constitute the type of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial’
information . . . to which the Zauderer standard may be applied.” 211
Instead, the court found that the graphics did not convey “any
warning information” and were “unabashed attempts to evoke
emotion . . . and browbeat [tobacco] consumers into quitting.” 212
Therefore, the D.C. Circuit opted to analyze the required disclosures
under the more stringent Central Hudson test. 213
204 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
205 Discount Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 559.
206 See id. at 562.
207 Id.
208 See id. at 563. The court noted that the warning label text had not been updated
since 1984 and the warnings are “easily overlooked.” Id.
209 Id. at 566.
210 See 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
211 Id. at 1216 (quoting Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985)); see also id. (“The disclosures approved in Zauderer . . . were clear statements that
were both indisputably accurate and not subject to misinterpretation by consumers.”).
212 Id. at 1216–17.
213 See id. at 1217.
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In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,
the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test to determine whether
certain commercial speech is protected from government
interference by the First Amendment. 214 First, the commercial
speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.215
Second, the government’s interest in regulating the commercial
speech must be substantial. 216 If both elements are satisfied, courts
must determine “whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted.” 217 Finally, the regulation cannot be
“more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” 218
Under a Central Hudson analysis, the D.C. Circuit found that the
FDA’s regulations could be assumed to be substantial. 219 However,
the R.J. Reynolds court found that the FDA failed to demonstrate that
the graphic warning requirements would “directly advance the
asserted interest.” 220 The majority noted that it was the government’s
burden to justify a restriction on commercial speech. 221 The court
found, however, that the FDA did not provide a “shred of evidence”
that graphic warnings would “‘directly advance’ its interest in
reducing the number of Americans who smoke.” 222 Moreover, the
FDA did not show that graphic warnings “have directly caused a
material decrease in smoking rates,” 223 and the court criticized the
FDA’s reliance on Canadian and Australian studies that did not
demonstrate that graphic warnings “actually led to a reduction in
smoking rates.”224 Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the FDA
delayed the implementation of the mandated graphics and conducted new studies. 225 New graphics have yet to be implemented. 226

214 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
220 See id. at 1219.
221 See id. at 1218.
222 Id. at 1219.
223 Id.
224 See id.
225 See Gregory Curfman, Graphic Cigarette Warning Labels, the First Amendment, and
Public Right to Accurate Public Health Information: Graphic Cigarette Warning Labels Back Under
Legal Scrutiny, JAMA HEALTH F., Sept. 2021, at 1, 4 (“[I]n response to the opinion of the
DC Circuit, the FDA has undertaken further extensive studies to create, in collaboration
with a professional medical illustrator, 13 new graphic warning labels.”).
226 See Order at 1, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, No. 20-cv-00176 (E.D. Tex. Nov.
12, 2021), ECF No. 93 (delaying the implementation of new graphics until January 9,
2023).
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Mandatory warnings disclosing the harms of teenage social
media use would likely fail both the Zauderer test and the Central
Hudson test. First, under Zauderer, the government would have to
demonstrate that the required warning disclosure contained “purely
factual and uncontroversial information.” 227 Unlike research on
tobacco use, 228 there is a dearth of factual findings that social media
use causes harm. 229 Studies have only demonstrated a correlative
relationship between adolescent social media use and its harmful
effects. 230 In contrast, it is unequivocal that tobacco use is harmful,
and that finding is supported by decades of research. 231 Not only is it
not “purely factual” that adolescent social media use causes harms, it
is not “uncontroversial.” 232 In response to a comparison between the
Big Tobacco and social media companies, Andy Stone, a Facebook
spokesperson, called the comparison “absurd” and argued that
“[s]ocial media helps people connect and small businesses thrive.
Instead of making false equivalencies, the focus should be on
updated regulation to address privacy, data portability, content
standards and elections.”233 Therefore, a hypothetical disclosure that
appeared on a teenager’s social media feed that read “WARNING:
SOCIAL MEDIA USE IS HARMFUL TO YOUR HEALTH” would not
be purely factual nor uncontroversial pending research that firmly
established causation.
Moreover, required disclosure must be “reasonably related to
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”234 The
Discount Tobacco court held that the required disclosure “has to
advance the purpose only slightly.” 235 However, in Discount Tobacco,
the required graphics’ purpose was “to prevent consumers from
being misled about the health risks of using tobacco.”236 Without
227 Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
228 See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
229 See Amy Orben & Andrew K. Przybylski, Screens, Teens, and Psychological Well-Being:
Evidence from Three Time-Use-Diary Studies, 30 PSYCH. SCI. 682, 682 (2019) (“There is little
clear-cut evidence that screen time decreases adolescent well-being.”).
230 See id.; supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
231 See SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 81. See generally CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 199, at 13–111.
232 See Orben & Przybylski, supra note 229, at 682 (arguing that studies that have
demonstrated screen-time decreases adolescent well-being “are based on single-country,
exploratory studies that rely on inaccurate but popular self-report measures”).
233 Cecilia Kang, Lawmakers See Path to Rein in Tech, but It Isn’t Smooth, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/09/technology/facebook-bigtobacco-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/85BH-UQKJ].
234 Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
235 Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 557 (6th Cir.
2012).
236 Id. at 561.
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findings that social media use causes significant harms to teenagers,
the government does not have an interest in preventing users from
being misled because there is not enough evidence that they are
actually being misled. 237
As of now, a mandated social media disclosure would not
contain purely factual and uncontroversial information. Therefore,
the required speech would likely be subject to a Central Hudson
analysis. 238 The social media mandate would likely fail immediately.
Whereas in R.J. Reynolds the court could assume that the government
had a substantial interest in regulating speech, given the harms of
tobacco and the stated purposes of the TCA, such a substantial
interest does not exist yet for regulating social media. 239 As the R.J.
Reynolds court asserted, “[t]he government bears the burden of
justifying its attempt to restrict commercial speech and its burden is
not light.”240 Under a Central Hudson analysis, the court cannot
“supplant the precise interests put forward by the State with other
suppositions.”241 Therefore, the government must demonstrate that
it has a substantial interest in regulating teenage social media use in
order to compel social media companies to place a warning on their
products. Moreover, like the TCA empowered the FDA to create the
actual content of the required disclosures, 242 it is likely that the
content and method of delivery of a mandatory disclosure on social
media would be delegated to a federal agency. If a federal agency
were to establish the required disclosures, that would trigger 5 U.S.C.

237 Other circuits have found that the purpose of the disclosure does not need to be
solely about preventing consumer deception. The Second Circuit, in addressing whether
a mandatory warning that lamps containing mercury must be labeled as such, held that a
disclosure does not need to prevent customer deception per se. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n
v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2001). The court found that the purpose of the
mandate was to reduce the amount of mercury in the environment and that the disclosure
was “inextricably intertwined with the goal of increasing consumer awareness of the
presence of mercury in a variety of products.” Id. at 115. Therefore, the “reasonable
relationship [was] plain.” Id. In that case, however, it was factual that certain lamps
contained mercury. See id. at 107. Even if a mandated social media warning was
“inextricably intertwined with the goal of increasing consumer awareness,” without
establishing that there were harms that needed to be mitigated, and that consumers
needed to be aware of those harms, there is no reasonable relationship between the state’s
interest and a mandated disclosure.
238 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(discussing why compelled speech that is not purely factual and uncontroversial cannot be
analyzed under Zauderer and why a Central Hudson analysis is appropriate).
239 See id. at 1218 (highlighting the demonstrated and evidence-backed purposes of
the TCA and FDA graphic regulations).
240 Id. at 1218 (citation omitted) (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).
241 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768.
242 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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§ 706 on judicial review of the agency’s actions. 243 Whatever agency is
tasked with crafting social media warnings would have to prove that
the agency’s action was “supported by substantial evidence.” 244
Again, without substantial evidence that social media use causes
harms, the government will fail to show that there is a compelling
government interest in regulating social media through compelled
speech.
Moreover, even if there was found to be a compelling
government interest in regulating social media, the government
would need to prove that the mandated warning “directly advances
the governmental interest asserted.” 245 The Supreme Court has held
that the Central Hudson test places a heavy burden on the government
to prove both its substantial interest and that its regulation is an
effective way to address that interest:
[T]he Government carries the burden of showing that the
challenged regulation advances the Government’s interest “in a
direct and material way.” That burden “is not satisfied by mere
speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to
sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate
them to a material degree.” 246

Once again, the government does not possess the evidence it needs
in order to justify that the “harms it recites are real” and that social
media warnings will “alleviate them to a material degree.”
For the foregoing reasons, a social media regulatory scheme will
likely not overcome constitutional hurdles until the government can
establish that it has a substantial government interest. Without this
substantial government interest, attempts to restrict American
adolescents’ access to social media and/or mandating warning
disclosures regarding the harms of social media use will likely be
successfully challenged by social media companies who have a vested
interest in attracting young users and keeping them as engaged as
possible. 247

243 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the
terms of an agency action.”).
244 See id. § 706(2)(E) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by substantial
evidence . . . .”).
245 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
246 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767, 770–771).
247 See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
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WHERE DO LAWMAKERS GO FROM HERE?

With the above-mentioned regulatory provisions likely to be
challenged, where do regulators go from here? It is evident from the
discussion above that the federal government likely does not have
enough data or causative findings to demonstrate that social media
use is harmful to teenagers. 248 While there are plenty of correlative
studies and anecdotal accounts of the harms that social media poses,
there has yet to be a landmark report like the 1964 Surgeon
General’s Smoking & Health report. 249 That report definitively catalyzed the beginning of the tobacco regulatory scheme. 250 Similarly,
regulators should pursue a comprehensive report regarding social
media products.
Frances Haugen, during her congressional testimony, lamented
the lack of insight that the government has into the operations and
data compiled by social media companies. 251 Unlike tobacco
products that can be independently tested, Ms. Haugen argued that it
is currently impossible to verify the claims companies like Facebook
make about their products. She said:
When the tobacco companies claimed that filtered cigarettes were
safer for consumers, it was possible for scientists to independently
invalidate that marketing message and confirm that in fact they
posed a greater threat to human health. But today we can’t make
this kind of independent assessment of Facebook. We have to just
trust what Facebook says is true—and they have repeatedly proved
that they do not deserve our blind faith. 252

If the federal government is interested in pursuing a more
robust social media regulatory scheme, it should start with aggressive
research. The TCA provides a blueprint for mandating information
from private companies regarding the effects their products have on
users. In order to keep Congress informed, tobacco companies must
provide the federal government with “[a]ny or all documents . . .
248 See Laurence Steinberg, Opinion, Does Instagram Harm Girls? No One Actually
Knows, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/10/opinion
/instagram-facebook-mental-health-study.html [https://perma.cc/KEY6-39UW] (“[The]
correlation between Instagram use and self-reported psychological distress is concerning.
But such a finding should be used as a starting point for research, not as a conclusion.
Psychological research has repeatedly shown that we often don’t understand ourselves as
well as we think we do.”).
249 See SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 81.
250 See BRANDT, supra note 79, at 242–43 (highlighting the lack of tobacco regulation
before the 1964 Surgeon General’s report and noting that the first regulations appeared
because of the report).
251 See Written Statement of Frances Haugen, supra note 7, at 3.
252 Id. (footnote omitted).
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relating to research activities, and research findings, conducted,
supported, or possessed by the manufacturer . . . on the health,
toxicological, behavioral, or physiologic effects of tobacco
products.” 253 Tobacco manufacturers are now also required to
register annually with the FDA. 254 Additionally, tobacco companies
must maintain records and “provide such information, as the
Secretary [of Health and Human Services] may by regulation
reasonably require to . . . protect public health.” 255
Generally
speaking, a social media regulatory scheme could start with similar
requirements. By gaining access to the plethora of data that social
media companies possess, the government will have the verifiable
information needed to test the hypothesis that social media use
endangers teenagers’ health. Moreover, the information may prove
that there are only negligible harms to teenagers and, therefore, a
regulatory scheme is not necessary.
Recently, the Surgeon General issued an advisory regarding
social media platforms’ amplification of vaccine and COVID-19
misinformation. 256 In the advisory he called on social media
platforms to “[g]ive researchers access to useful data to properly
analyze the spread and impact of misinformation.” 257 While the
Surgeon General was only focused on a single harmful effect of social
media, the advisory signals that the Surgeon General may be treating
social media as a harmful product that must be studied in order to
protect the public’s health. Lawmakers could explicitly empower the
Surgeon General with the authority to pursue further research on the
harmful effects of social media. 258 Furthermore, empowering the
Surgeon General would put social media companies on notice and
may lead to companies pursuing a more effective self-regulatory
scheme to stave off federal regulations.

See 21 U.S.C. § 387d(b)(1) (2018).
See id. § 387e(b).
See id. § 387i(a).
See U.S. SURGEON GEN., CONFRONTING HEALTH MISINFORMATION: THE U.S.
SURGEON GENERAL’S ADVISORY ON BUILDING A HEALTHY INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
(2021).
257 Id. at 12.
258 Another interesting approach would be to leverage the information privacy
regulatory regime in order to effectuate more protections for teenage social media users.
By increasing the minimum age under COPPA, social media companies would likely have
to be more diligent about how it protects its teenage users. A Senate bill introduced in
2019 proposed increasing the minimum age to sixteen. See S. 748, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(19)
(2019). While beyond the scope of this Note, a later version of this work may investigate
the effectiveness of this approach.
253
254
255
256
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CONCLUSION
Lawmakers, pundits, and tech executives’ assertions that social
media should be regulated like tobacco is oversimplistic and
disregards the inherent difference between regulating a physical
product that has no constitutional protection and a virtual product
that can implicate First Amendment rights. While the “Facebook
Files” have sparked critiques and Senate hearings, there has yet to be
strong, causal evidence that social media is so harmful that the
government need intervene to protect adolescent Americans.
Nevertheless, these social media companies—and the potential harms
of their products—deserve further scrutiny and research. Lawmakers
must remember that the tobacco regulatory scheme evolved over
decades—and is still being constitutionally challenged. Creating a
robust statutory scheme to regulate a multibillion-dollar industry
takes time, patience, and diligence.
In a quiet moment of reflection during his recent comedy
special for Netflix, Bo Burnham, a comedian and social critic,
reflected on our collective embrace of social media companies over
the past decade. 259 He said, “maybe allowing giant digital media
corporations to exploit the neurochemical drama of our children . . .
maybe that was a bad call by us.” 260 Something similar could have
been said about cigarettes and children’s lungs in the 1950s.
Fortunately, unlike the tobacco regulatory scheme, lawmakers are not
waiting decades to act.

259
260

See BO BURNHAM: INSIDE (Netflix 2021).
Id.

